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if they contain less than six rooms for rent and if actually occupied by the
proprietor.13 2 Any place of public accommodation otherwise included in title II
is not affected by the act if it is found not to affect interstate commerce and the
discrimination is unsupported by state action. 133 For instance, if a substantial
portion of the products sold in an establishment engaged in selling food have not
moved in interstate commerce, state action will still have to be found, 34 since
individual discrimination is not proscribed by the act unless the interstate
commerce requirement is fulfilled. 135 However, the Court has indicated in
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States136 that practically any establishment
enumerated in the act as a place of public accommodation may fulfill the commerce
requirement. So long as interstate commerce "feels the pinch,"137 it matters not
how local the operation which "applies the squeeze."138
In the event that an establishment is found not to be a place of public
accommodation within the meaning of the act, the Court may again be called
upon to consider the distinctions between state action prohibited by the four-
teenth amendment and individual discrimination. Today the state action con-
cept has reached a delicate point of balance between equality in places of
public accommodations and liberty in the enjoyment of property. But unless the
scales are tipped by a change in the composition of the Supreme Court or by
one Justice being persuaded by his opposing brothers' argument, state action
will not be found where a property owner simply employs state police, trespass
laws, and courts to enforce his policy of racial discrimination.
Hugh S. Johnston*
13242 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(b)(1) (1964).
13342 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(b) (1964).
13442 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(c) (1964).
'35 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(b) (1964).
136379 U.S. 241 (1964).
137United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfg. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949).
138 Ibid.
* Member, Second Year Class.
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY FOR RIOT DAMAGE
The vigor of the civil rights movement has on a few occasions taken a destruc-
tive turn. Some protests in both northern and southern cities, whatever good they
have done, have also caused property damage and personal injury on a large
scale.'
Who should pay for such damge? It is the responsibility of local government
1 Outbreaks in Harlem in 1935 and 1943 left nine dead, some 600 injured and
property damage estimated at six million dollars. The 1964 Harlem riots saw one per-
son killed, 140 injured, and over 500 cases of property damage reported. Time, July
31, 1964, p. 11, 15, 16.
NOTES
to maintain order. Does it follow, then, that a person damaged by a public dis-
order can recover from the municipality which failed to keep the peace?
In England and in some American jurisdictions he may. The development and
scope of this form of relief is our subject.
History of Communal Liability
The protection of life and property within its boundaries by a county or
municipality is considered a "governmental" and not a "proprietary" function.
2
Traditional notions of sovereign immunity shield local government from liability
for failures which are purely "governmental."3 Hence, in the absence of a statute
abrogating this immunity, an injured citizen has no action against his municipality
no matter how derelict it has been in maintaining order.
4
Long before the doctrine of municipal immunity took shape, however, statutes
in England imposed liability on the citizens of the "hundred" for crimes com-
mitted in their neighborhood. 5 By the thirteenth century that practice was firmly
established and embodied in the Statute of Winchester. 6 The people of an area
in which a felony or robbery had occurred would have to make good whatever
monetary loss had been suffered unless they could deliver the responsible criminals
to the king's officers within forty days.7 The tone of Winchester indicates clearly
the policy argument behind the enactment. It opens with a flurry of righteous
disgust:
Forasmuch as from Day to Day, Robberies, Muz3hers, Burnings, and Theft,
be more often used than they have been heretofore, and Felons cannot be attainted
by the Oath of Jurors, which had rather suffer Strangers to be robbed, and so
pass without Pain, than indite the Offenders .... 8
2 Gianfortone v. New Orleans, 61 Fed. 64 (C.C.E.D. La. 1894); see Annot., 13
A.L.R. 751 (1921); 18 McQumLLI, MUNICPAL Comu'oARToNs § 53.145 (3d ed. rev.
1963).
3 See James, Tort Liability of Local Governmental Units and Their Officers, 22
U. Cm. L. REv. 610 (1955); Smith, Municipal Tort Liability, 48 MicH. L. REV. 41
(1949).
4 Clear Lake Water Works Co. v. Lake County, 45 Cal. 90 (1872); Reid v. City
of Niagara Falls, 29 Misc. 2d 855, 216 N.Y.S.2d 850 (Sup. Ct. 1963); King v. City of
New York, 3 Misc. 2d 241, 152 N.Y.S.2d 110 (Sup. Ct. 1956); see 20 C.J.S. Counties
§ 219 (1940); Annot., 52 A.L.R. 562 (1928).
5 Immunity for local government, while it may have existed earlier, assumed its
present form near the end of the eighteenth century. See Russell v. Men of Devon,
2 Term. Rep. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1798); authorities cited note 3 supra. The prac-
tice of imposing liability on the "hundred" dates from the eleventh century. See Darling-
ton v. New York, 31 N.Y. 164, 88 Am. Dec. 248 (1865) where the method is traced
back to the reign of Canute the Dane (1016-1035).
6 13 Edw. 1, stat. 2, c. 2, 3 (1285). This is often erroneously cited as the Statute
of Westminster, Second, 13 Edw. 1, stat. 1, c. 3 (1285).
7"And if the Country will not answer for the Bodies of such manner of Of-
fenders, the Pain shall be such, that every Country, that is to wit, the People
dwelling in the Country, shall be answerable for the robberies done, and also
the Damages; so that the whole Hundred where the Robbery shall be done...
shall be answerable... 13 Edw. 1, stat. 2, c. 2 (1285).
sid c. 1.
[Vol. 16THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Primary responsibility for keeping the peace rested on -the people of the "hundred"
who were obliged to pursue felons by hue and cry and bring them to trial 9 If
they chose to be less than diligent in their pursuit, let them pay for their leisure.
The theory (as well as the tone) of the Statute of Winchester was first
specifically applied to "riots and tumults" in what has become known as the
English Riot Act of 1714.10 By this act the inhabitants of the "hundred" wherein
persons had unlawfully assembled were made liable to compensate anyone whose
property was damaged by the assembly." Provisions of Winchester and the Riot
Act, along with related acts,'2 survived in their original form until 1827 when
they were repealed in connection with a program of statutory revision.13 Their
remedies relative to riot damage were immediately embodied in new legislation.
14
The present English statute is the Riot (Damages) Act of 1886.15 Its provi-
sions are virtually the same as those of the 1714 act. The political subdivision upon
which liability is imposed is now the "police district," but that liability is still
absolute and the cost of it is still to be offset by taxation within the district.
The American Position
In spite of this unbroken series of statutes in England, the notion of communal
liability for riot damage was not widely received as a part of the common law
in this country.'0 But the appeal of communal liability as an equitable method
of spreading the loss, and as a stimulus for public interest in law enforcement' 7
has prompted a significant minority of our states to create that liability by
statute.18
9 3 Edw. 1, c. 9 (1275).
101 Geo. 1, stat. 2, c. 5 (1714).
" The provision whereby the "hundred" could save itself from liability by appre-
hending the wrongdoers within forty days was left out of the Riot Act of 1714. Failure
to apprehend continued as a condition precedent to liability in robbery, murder and
similar cases but it never appeared as such in the riot legislation. Liability for riot, then,
was absolute and unconditional.
1228 Edw. 3, c. 11 (1354) simply affrmed the Statute of Winchester. 27 Eliz.,
c. 13 (1585) stipulated procedures for recovery and provided for spreading the cost of
liability by taxation. 9 Geo. 1, c. 22 (1722) and 8 Geo. 2, c. 16 (1735) established more
procedure.
137 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 27 (1827).
14 Id. c. 31 and 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 72 (,1832).
1549 & 50 Viet., c. 38 (1886).
16Lee v. Kansas City, 175 Kan. 729, 267 P.2d 931 (1954). See authorities cited
notes 2 & 4 supra.
17See Chicago v. Sturges, 222 U.S. 313 (1911); Slaton v. City of Chicago, 8 I1M.
App. 2d 47, 130 N.E.2d 205 (1955); Darlington v. New York, 31 N.Y. 164, 88 Am.
Dec. 248 (1865); Marshall v. Buffalo, 50 App. Div. 149, 64 N.Y. Supp. 411 (1900).
I8 CoNN. GEN. STAT. Bnv. § 7-108 (1958); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-201
(1949); Ky. REy. STAT. ANN. § 411.100 (1963); LA. Rnv. STAT. § 33:5065 (1950); ME.
Rxv. STAT. ANN. ch. 136, § 8 (1954); Mi. ANN. CODE art. 82, §§ 1-3 (1957); MAss.
ANN. LAws ch. 269, § 8 (1956); Mo. Bnv. STAT. §§ 537.140-.160 (1959); MoNT.
BEv. CODES ANN. § 11-1503 (1947); N.H. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 31:53 (1955); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 2A:48-1 to 48-7 (1952); N.Y. Mumc. LAw § 71; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16,
§ 11821 (1956); R.I. G N. LAws ANN. § 45-15-13 (1956); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-107
(1962); Wis. STAT. § 66.091 (1961).
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Sixteen states impose liability for riot damage on the county or municipality. 19
The scope of the liability takes various forms. A few states allow recovery for
personal injury as well as property damage, thus departing from the exclusive
concern for property which we find in the English precedents. 20 A more significant
departure from their historical background is seen in the Connecticut, Kentucky,
and Maryland statutes. These three abandon the strict liability approach and
require a showing of some dereliction of duty on the part of the government in
suppressing or controlling the riot. Three other states allow only a partial re-
covery.
21
Only the New York statute has seen extensive use in connection with civil
rights demonstrations. 22 In Feinstein v. City of New York,2 3 the leading case
arising from the 1935 Harlem riots, the court applied the New York riot damage
act to compensate a businessman whose store front had been destroyed. This
method of compensation, the court held, was both practical and well supported -by
New York precedent.2 4 When a new series of riots erupted in Harlem in 1943 the
riot damage act was under a temporary suspension imposed by wartime emergency
laws.25 The courts continued to recognize the principle of communal liability as
firmly established, even though it was temporarily unavailable.
26
It is perhaps a testimony to our national good order and discipline that the
riot damage acts of most other states have found relatively little use.
Municipal Liability in California
The California riot damage statute27 was typical of the communal liability
laws. It was enacted in 1868 as the first statutory waiver of sovereign immunity
in the State.2 8 It applied to property damage only, imposed absolute liability on
the local political entity, and allowed full recovery.
Chinese tong wars in the late nineteenth century led to use of the statute on
two occasions.29 A farm labor riot in this century gave rise to the leading Cali-
'9 Ibid.
20 Connecticut, Kansas, and Wisconsin.
2 1 Maine, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island allow 3/4 recovery.
22 For a review of seventy years of litigation under the New York statute, see N.Y.
Law Journal, July 30, 31, 1964, p. 1.
23 157 Misc. 157, 283 N.Y.S. 335 (City of New York Munic. Ct. 1935).
24 Darlington v. New York, 31 N.Y. 164, 88 Am. Dec. 248 (1865); Marshall v.
Buffalo, 50 App. Div. 149, 64 N.Y. Supp. 411 (1900).
25 See Finkelstein v. City of New York, 182 Misc. 271, 47 N.Y.S.2d 156 (Sup. Ct.
1944), aff'd, 295 N.Y. 730, 65 N.E.2d 432 (1946).
26 Blumldn v. City of New York, 183 Misc. 31, 47 N.Y.S.2d 492 (Sup. Ct. 1944);
Butchers' Mut. Cas. Co. v. City of New York, 182 Misc. 809, 52 N.Y.S.2d 121 (Sup. Ct.
1944); D & D Chemist Shops v. City of New York, 181 Misc. 686, 47 N.Y.S.2d 163
(Sup. Ct. 1944), rev'd, 269 App. Div. 741, 55 N.Y.S.2d 114 (1945); 146 W. 117th St.
v. City of New York, 50 N.Y.S.2d 569 (City of New York, City Ct. 1944).
27 Cal. Stats. 1949, ch. 81, § 1. As codified this enactment was CAL. GOV'T CoDE
§§ 50140-45.
2 8 See David, Municipal Tort Liability in California, 7 So. CAL. L. REv. 372, 380
(1934).
29 Bartlett v. San Francisco, 63 Cal. 156 (1883); Wing Chung v. Los Angeles, 47
Cal. 531 (1874).
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fomia case on municipal liability.3° But the statute seems to have been called
upon rarely. It appears as the basis of relief in only three other reported cases.
31
In 1963, after ninety-five years of living with municipal liability for riot dam-
age, the California legislature repealed the statute.3 2 The repeal came as one of
the many consequences of the Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist. case.33 Muskopf
held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was "mistaken and unjust" and
would no longer protect governmental entities from civil liability for their torts.
Thus most California statutes dealing with governmental immunity became
anomalies. They had been drafted under the assumption that -the underlying rule
was immunity. Now immunity, where it existed, was to be the exception and
the underlying rule was liability.3 4
If this enormous change in California law cast adrift scores of statutes, leaving
them abrogating something which no longer existed, it had no such effect on the
riot damage act. This act imposed a liability which was absolute. While immunity
was the rule it operated as a waiver of that immunity. If liability was the rule it
still served to impose an absolute liability which would not have existed without
the statute.3 5 This function of the act was, however, not enough to save it.
The California Law Revision Commission undertook a study of the effects of
the Muskopf decision. Their recommendations called for repeal of the now
anomalous waivers of immunity, and a re-establishment of immunity by statute in
selected areas.3 6 They also recommended repeal of the riot damage act, on
grounds that any imposition of absolute liability was inconsistent with the new
standards of immunity urged in their report.37 Most of the Commission's recom-
mendations were enacted as law during the 1963 regular session of the legisla-
ture.38 The riot damage act was repealed3 9 and at the same time (and upon the
same recommendation) provisions were enacted saving public entities and their
employees from liability for failure to enforce any law.
49
This combination of repeal and enactment seems to have stifled not only
3
0Agudo v. Monterey County, 13 Cal. 2d 285, 89 P.2d 400 (1939).
31 Bank of Cal. v. Shaber, 55 Cal. 322 (1880); Clear Lake Water Works Co. v.
Lake County, 45 Cal. 90 (1872); Chamon v. San Francisco, 1 Cal. Unrep. 509 (1869).
32 Cal. Stats. 1963, Ch. 1681, § 18.
3355 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961).
34See generally Cobey, The New California Governmental Liability Statutes, '1
HArr. J. LGIsLATiON 16 (1964).
35 See Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: Judicial Lawmaking in a Statutory
Milieu, 15 STAN. L. Ptv. 203, 204 (1963).
304 CAL. LA W REvmiON CownviN REP. RECOmimNDATiONS & SnmnEs 801 (1963).
3 7 "Sections 50140 through 50145 of the Government Code are inconsistent
with the foregoing recommendations (relating to non-liability for failure to
preserve health and safety). These sections impose absolute liability upon cities
and counties for property damage caused by mobs or riots within their
boundaries. These sections are an anachronism in modem law. They are
derived from similar English laws that date back to a time when the govern-
ment relied on local townspeople to suppress riots. The risk of property loss
from mob or riot activity is now spread through standard provisions of insur-
ance policies. Accordingly these sections should be repealed." Id. at 818.
38 Cal. Stats. 1963, ch. 1681.
39 Id. at § 18.
40 CAL. GovT CODE §§ 818.2, 821, 846.
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absolute communal liability for mob violence but liability based on fault as well.
A California property owner whose property has been damaged by riot cannot
now recover from his local government on any theory. He has no claim against
them based on strict liability because we have seen that such liability does not
exist unless supported by statute, 41 and California no longer has a riot damage
statute. He has no claim based on the government's negligent or intentional failure
to enforce the law because the Government Code has established immunity from
liability for such failures.4
2
This complete countermarch from absolute liability to no liability at all has
left the property owner few sources of relief. He may, of course, recover from
the rioters or from any individual rioter, the full amount of damage done.43 But
this will be a meaningful remedy only in cases where the rioters can be identified,
then later located for service of process, and where they have sufficient assets to
make collection of a judgment possible. Mobs which destroy property are not
likely to be made up of such vulnerable, established citizens.
The only effective source of relief would seem to be that favored by the Law
Revision Commission: "standard provisions of insurance policies." Assuming that
those "standard provisions" would be adequate, one still may seriously question
if they would be as fitting as liability imposed on all the people through the
agencies to which they have delegated the task of keeping the peace.
Communal liability for riot damage, financed by taxation of those in the im-
mediate locale where the riot occurred, has several advantages which the Law
Revision Commission seems not to have considered. First, private responsibility
for the maintenance of law and order did not disappear when we abandoned the
hue and cry. Lawlessness and the caliber of law enforcement in the community
are still matters for private concern. The first communal liability statutes in
England were, as we have seen, expressly designed to stimulate and insure that
concern. Early cases in this country recognized the same design in the American
statutes.44 Whether or not this purpose of communal liability has been achieved
is beyond the realm of proof, but it is difficult to believe that it has had no effect.
A local population faced with the certainty that they will have to pay for the
consequences of disorder could not afford to be less than vigilant in demanding
and assisting in the scrupulous enforcement of order. Second, distributing the cost
of riot damage through taxation puts the burden on the largest practical number
of citizens with little or no discrimination. Reliance on insurance, on the other
hand, burdens most those least likely to be responsible for riot damage, the
property owners. Few rioters will be affected by insurance rates for riot coverage,
but virtually all property owners will be. Local taxation, however, can (or can
be made to) reach both those prone to riot and those well disposed toward the
status quo.
These policy arguments -were not mentioned in the Law Revision Commis-
41 See authority cited notes 2 & 3 supra.
42See note 40 supra.
4 3 DeVries v. Brumback, 53 Cal. 2d 643, 349 P.2d 532, 2 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1960);
Schaefer v. Berinstein, 140 Cal. App. 2d 278, 295 P.2d 113 (1956).
44 Chicago v. Sturges, 222 U.S. 313 (1911); Darlington v. New York, 31 N.Y. 164,
88 Am. Dec. 248 (1865); Marshall v. Buffalo, 50 App. Div. 149, 64 N.Y. Supp. 411
(1900).
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